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This paper examines the e®ects of alternative policies on the distribution of education in both partial
and general equilibrium. Empirical evidence suggests a link between human capital (HC) accumula-
tion and wages dispersion, so that policies a®ecting education outcomes will also have an impact on
inequality, productivity and welfare. We build a life-cycle model of labor earnings and endogenous
education choice, allowing for agents' heterogeneity in several dimensions. PSID and CPS data are
used to estimate the parameters of a production function with di®erent kinds of human capital and
idiosyncratic labor risk processes. A by-product of the estimation procedure is an empirical density
of individual permanent e±ciency inferred from the distribution of observed wages. These estimates
are used to pin down some of the model's parameters. Numerical simulations are used to compare the
e®ects of alternative policy interventions on education participation, endogenous selection, life-cycle
earnings and wealth pro¯les, inequality and productivity.
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This paper examines policies designed to alter the equilibrium distribution of education
and their wider economic consequences. It also looks at the nature of education decisions
and the role that such decisions play in shaping life cycle earnings and wealth pro¯les.
Individual choices are analyzed in the context of a general equilibrium model with separate,
education-speci¯c spot markets for jobs. The unit price of (e±ciency-weighted) labor di®ers
by education group and equals marginal product.
We are interested in the equilibrium, long-term e®ects of policy interventions targeting
the wider population rather than limited groups, with relative labor prices endogenously
adjusting to changes in the aggregate supply of educated people1. We examine traditional
policies, such as tuition transfers and loan subsidies2, but we also devise and evaluate
alternative forms of policy intervention. The policy experiments are carried out through
numerical simulations, with some of the model's parameters directly estimated from PSID
and CPS data and others tuned to match speci¯c long-term features of the US economy. By
simulating and comparing equilibrium outcomes we aim to explore the quantitative aspects
of the relationship among schooling decisions, wages inequality and education policy. The
impact of diverse education policies on equilibrium measures of productivity, consumption
and welfare is also considered.
Research linking HC investment to life cycle earnings dates back to original work by
Mincer (1958), Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967). The ¯rst studies ignored the im-
portant issue of self selection into education, as described by Rosen (1977) and Willis and
Rosen (1979). Permanent and transitory individual characteristics are now acknowledged
as important determinants of education choices and have become a standard feature of HC
models. Empirical evidence supporting the plausibility of a link between human capital
accumulation and economic inequality has been provided, among others, by Mincer (1994).
In work relating education policies and individual preferences Fernandez and Rogerson
(1995) originally point out that heterogeneity among individuals, whether in terms of in-
1Admittedly, given that labor is bought and sold on spot markets,the demand for labor is always equal to the supply.
Alternatively, Acemoglu (2000) studies a model in which the demand for skills changes more than proportionally as a response
to the increase in the supply of skilled workers.
2Standard education policy is just one of the possible types of human capital policy. For example, changes in proportional
income taxation a®ect the life-cycle returns on HC and the opportunity costs of education, altering HC investment decisions.
1come, ability or locality, can generate con°icting preferences as to the kind of policies that
are most desirable3.
Studies on the evaluation of policy interventions in equilibrium are more recent. Heck-
man, Lochner, and Taber (1998b, 1998c) have led the way in advocating a novel approach
to policy evaluation which does not overlook equilibrium e®ects induced by the policy4.
In fact, statements regarding the e®ects of policy interventions which ignore price changes
induced by such interventions are misleading. Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) provide an
interesting application of G.E. modelling to the evaluation of education-¯nance reform in
the US. Later work by Cunha, Heckman, and Navarro (2004) reinforces the view that mod-
els that are able to construct equilibrium counterfactuals are essential to understanding the
wider consequences of policy interventions.
In the empirical literature on education policy, early work by Keane and Wolpin (1997)
focuses on the partial equilibrium e®ect of a tuition subsidy on young males' college par-
ticipation. A valuable generalization of their approach within a dynamic GE framework is
due to Lee (2001). Also Abraham (2001) examines wage inequality and education policy
in a GE model of skill biased technological change. All these studies restrict labor supply
to be ¯xed, although earlier theoretical research has uncovered interesting aspects of the
joint determination of life cycle labor supply and HC investment, among others Blinder and
Weiss (1976).
Our model incorporates two twists with respect to earlier work: ¯rst, optimal individual
labor supplies are an essential part of the lifetime earnings mechanism; second, agents'
heterogeneity has di®erent dimensions, including a permanent (ability) component and a
persistent e±ciency shock5. Each agent in our model represents a single-unit household,
conformably with the empirical analysis we produce.
Recent empirical evidence Hyslop (2001) indicates that labor supply explains little of the
rising earnings inequality for married men, but over 20 % of the rise in (both permanent and
transitory) family inequality during the period of rising wage inequality in the early 1980's6.
Moreover, the response in hours of work to changes in net wage is small for prime age male
earners. However, as pointed out by Eaton and Rosen (1980) in their seminal work on
3Fernandez and Rogerson (1995) consider ex-ante identical individuals who di®er only in income
4Heckman, Lochner, and Taber estimate and simulate a dynamic general equilibrium model of education accumulation,
assets accumulation and labor earnings with skill-biased technological change.
5Mortality risk is also explicitly included in the model.
6Hyslop (2001) also shows that labor supply explains roughly half of the modest rise in female inequality.
2taxation and HC accumulation, even if taxes have only a limited impact upon the quantity
of hours worked it is possible that they have an important e®ect on their quality, intended
as the type of human capital. This happens because tax changes can alter the incentives
for education. Moreover, even if individual labor supplies do not deviate much from some
average levels, it is the case that average levels di®er substantially between education groups.
For given market prices, work e®ort represents the intensity of human capital utilization and
individuals can self-select into education groups according to their preference for leisure 7.
Labor supply, therefore, represents an e®ective channel of adjustment to labor price signals
and an important determinant of the relative variation in skill prices8.
The other crucial twist in our model is the introduction of individual uncertainty over
the returns to HC in the form of idiosyncratic multiplicative shocks to labor e±ciency. As
Levhari and Weiss (1974) originally emphasized, uncertainty is of exceptional importance
in human capital investment decisions as the risk associated to such decisions is usually not
insurable nor diversi¯able. Problems of moral hazard can be extremely severe when insuring
labor risk because idiosyncratic shocks and individual ability can be partially or completely
unobservable to third parties. Given these problems the market is not likely to provide
insurance. Using a multiplicative form of earnings risk9 Eaton and Rosen (1980) show
how earnings taxation has an ambiguous e®ect on investment in human capital because it
impinges on two important parameters of the decision problem: for one, taxation reduces
the riskiness of returns to human capital investment10; in addition, taxation induces an
income e®ect that can in°uence the agents' willingness to bear risk. Thus, ignoring the
riskiness of education decisions can partly sway the results in the analysis of the e®ects of
earnings taxation and education policies.
We model three levels of education obtained through formal schooling and corresponding
to three types of HC which enter the production technology11. Education and employment
are mutually exclusive in each period. Foregone earnings and tuition charges are the direct
7This selection in our model happens through permanent unobserved characteristics.
8Consider, for example, taxes on labor earnings which reduce the return to HC investment but also the opportunity cost
of being in education represented by foregone earnings. When di®erences in lifetime labor supply between education groups
are present, the two e®ects are weighted by the relative intensity of HC utilization in the appropriate education group.
9They multiply education speci¯c earnings by a random variable.
10As the proportional tax rate increases, agents earn less from high realization of the shock but also lose less from the bad
ones. Therefore the overall risk is decreased.
11We distinguish among people with less than high school degrees (LTHS), high school graduates (HSG) and college graduates
(CG). The distinction between LTHS and HSG is based on di®erent earning and labor supply characteristics. Schooling is
the only way to accumulate human capital (no children nurturing or on-the-job training). The possible e®ects of OJT are
accounted for through an age-e±ciency pro¯le which is estimated for each education group.
3costs of schooling, and a utility cost comes in the form of reductions in leisure when studying.
Agents can accumulate real assets. We experiment with alternative ways to set the initial
conditions for assets 12. We also consider di®erent levels of correlation between ability and
initial assets holdings13.
In general, the model provides a way to look at endogenous equilibrium levels of aggregate
human capital, with associated wages, as a function of agents' optimizing schooling choices
and demographic factors. It provides a mapping from a set of initial conditions (that is,
initial agents' distribution over states such as permanent and persistent idiosyncratic shocks
and assets) into distributions over educational and economic attainments: this mapping
turns out to be ideal to study the economic implications of alternative policy interventions.
2 Model
We derive the optimal consumption and schooling choices for an individual of given ability
who supplies labor in a competitive market. A unique good is produced in the economy, and
it can be either consumed or used as physical capital. Di®erent kinds of human capital are an
input to the aggregate production function and command di®erent returns. Wage di®erences
among people are the consequence of di®erences in education (between group inequality)
and di®erences in labor e±ciency (within group inequality). People with di®erent labor
e±ciencies are perfect substitutes within schooling groups. Agents can accumulate assets
representing ownership shares on physical capital.
2.1 Demographics and preferences
Each agent represents a (non-altruistic) single-unit household, whose life starts at age 1
and lasts j periods, after which death is certain 14.Therefore the population consists of j
overlapping generations, each with an ex-ante identical distribution of heterogeneity. We
use the index j to denote age. Agents have a probability to survive in each period, denoted
as sj, which is decreasing in age. When annuity markets are absent we use a random
bequest mechanism to redistribute left over assets. Negative borrowing limits open up the
12Gale and Scholz (1994) show that inter vivos transfer for education represent only a part of total bequest. We ignore this
issue in this paper and redistribute assets only among the youngest. Of special interest is the case when the initial distribution
of wealth replicates the distribution prevailing among those who die in each period, as this has a realistic accidental bequest
interpretation.
13This can be thought of as a shortcut to incorporate the e®ect of parental background on ability formation, as extensively
documented in the literature, see Heckman and Carneiro (2003) for a review).
14Retirement is not modelled. We experiment also with di®erent labor life lenghts.
4possibility that people dying prematurely can be in debt15.
Agents face educational choices based on returns and costs, which depend on age, asset
holdings, permanent characteristics and labor shocks. Over the life cycle they choose the
labor supply path maximizing expected lifetime utility.16
The education level is denoted as e, with e = e1 the lowest and e = e3 the highest.
Permanent individual characteristics are denoted as µ and distributed over the domain
[µmin;µmax]. We let fzg
j
j=1 be a sequence of uninsurable idiosyncratic shocks. We also
assume that the distributions of ability µ and of idiosyncratic shocks z are independent of
time.
The spot market wage for education el is wel, individual labor supply is n 2 [0;1]. Leisure
l is the complement to one of n, and is chosen optimally, however the amount of leisure
consumed by students is a deterministic function of ability, de¯ned as fS = fS(µ).
Agents pay proportional taxes ¿n and ¿k on, respectively, labor and asset income: the
distinction is kept to capture the e®ect of physical capital taxation on HC accumulation,
due to a substitution between the two forms of investment17. Aggregate physical capital is
denoted as K. The risk free, pre-tax return on assets is r and the depreciation rate of K is
± > 0.
The period utility u(c;l) is concave in consumption c and leisure l = (1 ¡ n); it satis¯es
standard regularity conditions and in particular the Inada conditions.
The law of motion for the idiosyncratic e±ciency shocks is summarized by a transition
function ¼ denoted as ¼zj+1jzj = ¼fzj+1 j zjg.
Given some initial conditions ¹ x1 for the state variables, the age 1 household's utility








, is denoted as
U (¹ x1;c;l) and can be written as the expected discounted sum of period utilities









and ¯ is the intertemporal discount factor. The period budget
15Yaari (1965) considers this case explicitly and proves that, with functioning credit markets not making systematic losses,
the budget constraint must be such that individual can never go short on assets.
16A more detailed discussion of the implications of non-convexities due to binary decision variable can be found in Gallipoli
(2004). Existence and uniqueness results for the solution of the model are spelled out for the ¯nite life cycle case.
17This e®ect was ¯rst noted by Heckman (1976) and is very intuitive if we think of investment as a way to transfer resources
intertemporally. Changing the price of intertemporal substitution a®ects the quantity and quality of investments.
5constraint is
cj + aj+1 = [1 + r(1 ¡ ¿k)]aj + we exp
²j nj(1 ¡ ¿ne)(1 ¡ dj) ¡ (De ¡ Te)dj
18 (2)
where dj is a binary variable which is 1 if the agent is in education and 0 otherwise, and aj
denotes individual asset holdings19 at age j. De is the direct cost of schooling, Te summarizes
government subsidies towards education e.
The term exp²j is individual labor e±ciency, and ²j is de¯ned as
²j (µ;e;z) = µ + »j (e) + zj (3)
where »j (e) is an education-speci¯c age pro¯le.
2.2 Household's problem
The education choice depends on relative returns to di®erent education levels, current
pecuniary cost of schooling, permanent characteristics µ and current labor shock and asset
holdings, z and a20. Agents can go back to school, and their incentive to do so varies with
time preference and individual states.
To pass from el to el+1 an agent must continuously be a student for a (exogenously given)
number of periods in school21. No schooling is possible after e3 has been achieved.
Given prices and direct costs of schooling, the binary function dj = dj (µ;e;z;a) describes
schooling choice as a mapping from the space of individual states to set f0;1g, where 1
stands for full-time education status and 0 stands for full-time worker 22.
Conditional on entering the labor market, the labor supply policy of an agent is nj =
nj (µ;e;z;a j dj = 0)23.
2.3 Optimality and value functions
Without conditioning on the current education decision, the optimal policy of an agent can
be represented as a vector pj = (dj;aj+1), where aj+1 is the optimal saving policy and dj
the binary education decision.
19Individual asset holdings satisfy: aj ¸ amin for every j and aj+1 ¸ 0. The ¯rst inequality is a borrowing constraint,
whereas the second is a transversality condition for agents reaching age j.
20To keep the model as simple as possible we do not explicitly model the sector producing education.
21A state variable in this problem is therefore the number of previous years of education already under the belt: we do not
use additional notation for it, although this variable implicitly determines future budget constraints and utility.
22This sorting mechanism hinges on the assumption that progress from one educational level to the next may require more
than just one study spell. In the simulations we set the lenghts of the required study spells to match the features of the
educational system under investigation.
23Using the intratemporal margin condition it is possible to express the individual labor supply as a function of optimal
consumption and real wage. The analytical details of the labour/leisure intertemporal choice are provided in the Appendix.
6A functional equation is an equivalent and unique approach to the household's sequence
problem. We use value functions to characterize the optimal path24.
The functional equation can be written as







for given initial condition ¹ x1.25
We call J¤ (xj;pj¡1) the unconditional value function because it is de¯ned over all possible
education choices.
In order to characterize the unconditional value function it helps to consider two con-
ditional value functions which are obtained by assigning a value to (current) binary choice
dj. The conditional versions of J¤ (xj;pj¡1) are then the value of employment (dj = 0) and
the value of education (dj = 1).
We denote the conditional value function as J¤ (xj;pj¡1 j condition), with the condition
being the value of dj
26. The unconditional functional equation J¤ (xj;pj¡1) is the upper
envelope of the conditional values of employment and education. Without loss of gener-
ality, we can reduce the complexity of the value functions associated to di®erent kinds of
employment by making the choice of employment sector irreversible27.
Of course if agents had to possibility to return to education after a working spell they
could choose a di®erent employment sector, so we also assume that agents don't go back to
education.28
The conditional value of employment is denoted as J¤ (xj;pj¡1 j dj = 0) = Wj(µ;e;z;a)
and is unique.
If we rule out returning to education after a working spell, this value is de¯ned as
Wj(µ;e;z;a) = max
a0;n







In the class of employment value functions, special attention must be devoted to the
24In this section we use an hyphen "0" to identify next period unknown values and omit the age/time subscripts when
possible.
25Our problem satis¯es regularity conditions, described in Gallipoli (2004), under which a value function J¤ (xj;pj¡1)
satisfying the functional equation (4) exists.
26Such notation allows to summarize education status for both current and past periods (dj¡1 and dj), which su±ces for
our analysis.
27We assume that the costs of reverting to di®erent, feasible `careers' are su±ciently high.
28This assumption also reduces the degree of non concavity of the value functions describing the solutions, making the
numerical work easier.
When agents are allowed to go back to education, the discounted value of the future in (5) must be extended to include the
value of additional education.
7value function of newly employed agents. This conditional value is
J





where e¤ is the agent's education level: the conditional value of ¯rst-time employed equals
the highest employment value among those available. It is possible to prove that the
conditional value of employment is monotonous, concave and smooth, and the optimal
policy is single valued and continuous.
The conditional value of being in education, Vj = Vj(µ;e;z;a), also exists, is unique and
is de¯ned as
J
¤ (xj;pj¡1 j dj = 1) = Vj(µ;e;z;a) = max

















where e¤ is the education level of the agent. Both Vj and Wj are subject to (2).29 The
education value is not generally concave on the state space.30




We call this the unconditional problem because we are not restricting the value of the
binary choice dj.It is possible for the conditional values Vj and Wj to cross at some state
space locations, which may give to the unconditional value a peculiar \butter°y" shape. To
guarantee that education decisions are uniquely determined, we assume that whenever the
present value of education is at least as large as the present value of employment, education
is chosen over employment. Using this assumption and the set of results obtained for the
conditional optimal policies, we argue that the unconditional optimal policy is uniquely
determined and piecewise continuous.31
2.4 Aggregate variables
We study equilibrium allocations and assume a stationary population. The aggregate states
of the economy are aggregate physical capital K and e±ciency-weighted aggregate labor
29The conditional value of education e = e2 for people in the last year of schooling is such that Vj+1(µ;e3;z0;a0) <
Wj+1 (µ;e;z0;a0) for any e, which satis¯es the assumption that no further schooling is possible after reaching e3.
30This is potentially troubling because it raises issues of non-uniqueness of the optimal policies. This and related issues for
this class of models are discussed in Gallipoli (2004). A discussion for the in¯nitely lived case is in Townsend and Ueda (2003).
31The discontinuities in the asset policies occur at the switch points because of the jumps in marginal utility at such
locations. Nonetheless, the optimal policy duplet pj = (aj+1;dj) is continuous between successive switch points.
8supplies (referred to as human capital aggregates) H1, H2, and H3. The total stock of








hj (x)dÃj (x) (8)
where Ãj (x) = Ãj (µ;e;z;a).
Individual e±ciency-weighted labor supplies are denoted as hj and de¯ned as
hj (µ;e;z;a) = exp
²j(µ;e;z) nj (µ;e;z;a) (9)
We de¯ne a measure space (X;z(X);Ãj), where X is the individual state space and z(X)
is a ¾-algebra on X. For each set F µ z(X), let Ãj (F) represent the normalised measure
of age j agents whose individual states lie in F as a proportion of all age j agents. Calling
³j the fraction of age j agents in the economy we de¯ne
¹ = ¹(F;j) = ³jÃj (F)
as a measure of agents belonging to age group j with individual state vector (µ;e;z;a) 2 F.
The aggregate states determine the relative prices in the economy. The demographics are
stable, so that age j agents make up a constant fraction ³j of the population at any point
in time. The ³j values are normalized to sum up to 1 and are such that ³j+1 = sj³j.
2.5 Markets structure
The unique physical good is used as numeraire_ Such good can be either consumed or saved.
In this economy savings a represent ownership rights over physical capital K. We do not
model entrepreneurial choices directly, but maintain that entrepreneurs behave optimally
in managing ¯rms.
We consider model speci¯cations with and without missing annuity markets. In the sim-
ulations in which we allow non-degenerate asset holdings for new borns, we also experiment
with di®erent degrees of correlation between initial wealth and permanent characteristics
µ.32
We do not model involuntary unemployment, but people can choose to consume all their
leisure endowment if, for example, the market value of their time is too low.
32Imposing di®erent patterns of dependence between such marginal densities turns out to be useful if ability is correlated
with socio-economic background factors such as family wealth.
92.6 Technology
Firms maximize pro¯ts using a CRS technology and set wages competitively. The aggregate
technology employs physical and human capital and is denoted as F(H;K) with H =
fH1;H2;H3g. The relationship between human capital factors (H) and physical capital is
expressed as a Cobb-Douglas :
F(H;K) = ¹ AH
1¡®K
® (10)










with h = 1 given the CRS assumption.33
In this speci¯cation (A1;A2;A3) are share parameters, while ½ pins down the Allen
elasticity of substitution among labor inputs.34 When ½ is equal to zero the technology is
Cobb-Douglas, whereas values of ½ greater than zero indicate more substitutability than in














which has a symmetry property imposing that the elasticity of substitution between H2
and H3 is the same as the that between H3 and H1. Therefore, if ½2 > ½1 we have that H3
is more complementary with H1 than with H2. Also, the grouping allows separate parts of
the above technology to be Cobb-Douglas, when either ½2 or ½1 tend to zero.
The equilibrium conditions require that marginal products equal pre-tax prices so that
we = @F
@He for any education level e, and r + ± = @F
@K.
2.7 Government
Government has revenues from proportional taxation of labor and asset income at respec-
tively ¿ne and ¿k rate, and uses part of these revenues to subsidize education via a transfer
Te. We call G the residual non-education general government expenditure and assume
33For strict quasi-concavity of the production function ½ has to lie within (¡1;1).
34In the CES case, the Allen elasticity of substitution between any two inputs is 1
1¡½. This is also known as the Allen/Uzawa
E. of S. and is the most widely used. However, Blackorby and Russell (1981) show that there is no intution about what it
measures. Blackorby and Russell advocate the use of the so-called Morishima E. of S., and another alternative for multisector
models would be the so-called direct E. of S. proposed by McFadden. In what follows we just use the Allen E. of S. as a simple
approximation.
35Hamermesh (1993) attributes this `grouping' production function to Sato (1967).
10that G is lost in non productive activities. The government's behaviour is fully described
by the budget constraint, which requires that expenditures equal revenues obtained from
taxation36. The government has a balanced budget in each period.
3 Equilibrium
We use a notion of equilibrium in which the measure ¹(x;j) remains unchanged over time.
This notion of equilibrium is known as stationary recursive competitive equilibrium Lucas
(1980).37
3.1 Equilibrium de¯nition
Let (X;z(X);Ãj) be an age-speci¯c measure space with state space X and z(X) be a
¾-algebra on X.
Given some state vector x 2 X , a stationary equilibrium for this economy is a set of
decision rules dj (x), aj+1 (x), cj (x), nj (x), value functions Vj(x), Wj(x), price functions








, and a law of motion Q, such that:
1. dj (x), aj+1 (x), cj (x) and nj (x) are optimal decision rules and solve the household's
problem
2. Vj(µ;e;z;a), Wj(µ;e;z;a) are the associated value functions
3. Firms employ inputs so that
we = FHe for e 2 =
r + ± = FK
4. Ãj (x) is a stationary measure, that is Ãj (F) = Q(F;Ãj), where Q(¢;¢) is the law of
motion of Ãj (¢) and is generated by the optimal decisions dj (x), aj+1 (x), cj (x).38
5. The good, asset and labour markets clear39





















We assume that the government has a balanced budget in each period.
37Our model stis¯es the conditions for de¯ning a measure Ãj, such that ¹(x;j) = ³jÃj (x) is stationary as a function of the
markov process ¼fzj+1 j zjg and of the decision rules dj (x) and aj+1 (x), where x is an element of the state space.
38Given ³j, also ¹(x;j) = ³jÃj (x) is a stationary measure.
39Equilibrium de¯nitions in the asset and good markets must include cross border asset holding FX if the interest rate r is
constant.
11The goods market clearing equation is derived by integrating the individual budget
constraint.
4 Identi¯cation and Estimation
We estimate values for a set of production and e±ciency parameters using US data. This
section describes the procedures used to identify and estimate:
² education speci¯c age-earning pro¯les and idiosyncratic labor shock processes;
² the empirical density of idiosyncratic permanent characteristics µ over the working
population;40
² the aggregate technology parameters determining shares and, whenever possible, sub-
stitution elasticities for aggregate inputs.
Di®erent data sets are used in the process, namely CPS, PSID and NIPA.
4.1 Estimating wage equations: skill prices and age pro¯les
Skill prices and age-earning pro¯les can be estimated by imposing some structure on the
data, which we do by using our model. For each education group we study a wage equation
that is consistent with the individual earning mechanism of the model. The (log-linear)
speci¯cation of individual hourly wages is
lnweit = wet + g (ageeit) + ueit (12)
where
ueit = µi + zeit + mit (13)
In this notation weit denotes observed hourly wage rate for individual i at time t in education
group e, wet is a (time dependent) hourly return to the speci¯c human capital e, µi is
an individual ¯xed e®ect, g (ageeit) is a education-speci¯c function of age41 and zeit is
a education-speci¯c idiosyncratic shock, possibly autocorrelated. Finally, the term mit
denotes a measurement error component in wage.42
40It must be stressed that we refer to ability as a set of observable and unobservable characteristics that have a direct impact
on households' earnings but are not explicitly modelled.
41We do not include returns to experience. Experience is the di®erence between age and years of schooling, and agents
belonging to a given education group have roughly the same number of years of schooling. Therefore the age e®ects end up
capturing returns from experience as well as seniority.
42Di®erent identi¯cation results can be obtained depending on whether the error term is correlated over time. However, a
necessary identi¯cation condition is that measurement error is orthogonal to all observed and unobserved characteristics.
12Our steady state model does not include any time variation. However, recovering time
varying prices wt from data is of pivotal importance for the identi¯cation of age e®ects,
residual terms and, in a di®erent context, to pin down the evolution of HC aggregates
over time. Since we are primarily interested in non-demographic determinants of education
decisions, we do not model cohort e®ects explicitly. Self selection implies that ¯xed e®ects
are correlated with both education decisions and observed wage rates. By estimating a
distinct wage equation for each education group we control for the education self-selection
problem, but heterogeneity still represents an obstacle to identi¯cation.
Assuming linearity of the permanent error components, we identify our model parameters
by adopting a within group speci¯cation for wage equations. We estimate the following
speci¯cation
(lnweit ¡ lnwei) = (lnwet ¡ lnw) + g (ageeit ¡ ageei) + (ueit ¡ uei) (14)
where the upper-bar denotes an (individual) time average. This delivers consistent estimates
of time e®ects and age pro¯les43.
4.2 Wage data and results
For the estimation of wage equations we use longitudinal data from the PSID. The sample
is based on annual interviews between 1968 and 1997 and on bi-annual interviews from 1999
onwards. All interviews are retrospective, providing data on the previous year. The sample
for this study combines a cross-section sample of nearly 3,000 families, representative of
the US population, selected from the Survey Research Center's master sampling frame, and
a subsample of about 1,900 families interviewed previously by the Bureau of the Census
for the O±ce of Economic Opportunity. The subsample drawn from the OEO-Census
study was limited to low-income families, and compensatory weights were developed in
1968 to account for the di®erent sampling rates used to select the OEO sample component
as opposed to the SRC component44. A subsample of Latino (Latin American origins)
families was added in 1990 and dropped in 1995. Additional immigrant families were added
in 1997 and 1999. Moreover, in 1997 some families belonging to the OEO-Census sample
43A normalization of the estimation results is necessary to obtain age-earning pro¯les, skill prices and estimates of permanent
heterogeneity. These are then used in numerical simulations. The normalization is bound to be arbitrary because we don't
have any `metric' to measure and compare the relative contributions of age, skills and permanent heterogeneity in determining
the ¯nal wage rate. A description is included in the appendix.
44In fact the original 1968 wave data must be weighted unless one uses only the SRC representative cross section sample.
13component were dropped.
We do not use individuals associated with the Census low income sample, the Latino
sample or the New Immigrant sample45 and focus instead on the SRC core sample, which did
not su®er any systematic additions or reductions between 1968 and 2001 and was originally
representative of the US population.
The main earnings' variable in the PSID refers to the head of the household46 and is
described as total labor income of the head47. We use this measure, de°ated by the CPI-
U for all urban consumers, as the reference earning variable. By selecting only heads of
household we ignore other potential earners in a family unit and restrict our attention to
people with relatively strong attachment to the labor force.48
Information on the highest grade completed is used to allocate individuals to three
education groups: high school drop-outs (LTHS), high school graduates (HSG) and college
graduates (CG). A detailed description of our sample selection is reported in the appendix:
in brief, we select heads of household aged 25-60 who are not self-employed and have positive
labor income for at least 8 (possibly non continuous) years.
Figure (1) plots the evolution of mean and variance of log annual earnings over time in
our PSID sample, both by education group and for the whole sample.
The plot shows that average annual earnings have experienced a drop in real values
during the early 1980s, but a steep rise in the 1990s drove them to be almost 20% higher
in 2000 than in 1967 Big di®erences in the time evolution of earnings are evident for
di®erent education group: college graduates earnings rose by almost 30% over the sample
period, whereas high school drop-outs earnings barely managed to stay the same thanks
to a recovery in the late 1990s. The 1980s' drop in real earnings was accompanied by
higher dispersion in all groups. However, visual inspection suggests that while for college
graduates the earnings variance settled at the higher level, for other groups it did revert
to lower values (although still higher than in the 1970s). As college graduates represent an
45Lillard and Willis (1978) make the case that the SEO low income sample should be dropped because of endogenous
selection problems.
46In the PSID the head of the household is a male whenever there is a cohabiting male/female couple. Women are considered
heads of household only when living on their own. We do not address the related sample issues explicitly, but any gender
e®ects are likely to be captured in the ability estimates.
47This includes the labor part of both farm and business income, wages, bonuses, overtime, commissions, professional
practice and others. Labor earnings data are retrospective, as the questions refer to previous year's earnings, which means
that 1968 data refer to 1967 earnings.
48Using heads to approximate households' behaviour ¯nds some support in recent work by Hyslop (2001), who provides
evidence of very strong and positive assortive matching by couples and shows that such matching is based on permanent
individual characteristics.
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Figure 1: Mean and variance of log real annual earnings (in 1992 dollars), both by education group and
combined
ever increasing share of workers over time, this might suggest that less skilled people have
self-selected into the highest education group inducing a rise in within group inequality. In
fact, the relative size of the di®erent education groups has changed substantially
In order to give a rough idea of the importance of labor supply decision in shaping
earnings di®erences, we report in ¯gure (2) the mean and variance of hourly wage rates, both
for the combined sample and by education groups. Individual hourly wages are computed
as the ratio of yearly earnings and yearly hours worked, which introduces additional noise
in the measure (especially when earnings and hours are measured with error). Nonetheless,
the variances are lower than in the case of annual earnings, which we interpret as evidence
that labor supply decisions are a signi¯cant mechanism linking wage changes and earnings
dispersion. Interestingly, the evolution of average hourly wage rates is remarkably similar
to annual earnings. This preliminary evidence points to the possibility that di®erences in
permanent characteristics (e.g., taste for leisure) might induce self-selection into education
groups, which in turn drives di®erences in dispersion.
We use hourly wage rates as dependent variable in the wage equations.49 We estimate
a wage speci¯cation as in(14) and use a 4th degree polynomial in age to approximate the
49The case for using hourly rates rather than annual earnings is presented by Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2004).
They also point out the importance of labor supply in shaping dispersion.
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Figure 2: Mean and variance of log real hourly wage rates (in 1992 dollars), both by education group and
combined
possibly non linear ((ageit) functions (for the LTHS group just a 2nd degree polynomial is
su±cient to characterize the age pro¯le). The age polynomials0coe±cients are presented in
table (1).
Table 1: Age polynomials' coe±cients
Dependent variable: log hourly earnings














Figure (??) plots the age pro¯les implied by the polynomial estimates for di®erent edu-
cation groups.
By ¯tting the within group speci¯cation of the wage equation we also obtain ln ^ wet,
estimates of the log-price of labor by education and year, which are plotted in ¯gure (4).
The time e®ects have a natural interpretation as time varying prices of skills associated to
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Figure 3: Age pro¯les of labor e±ciency by education group - age on the horizontal axis
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Figure 4: Estimated log of marginal labor productivity, by education and year
17di®erent education groups and will be used to identify the supply of human capital in the
economy.50 The log of marginal returns indicate that, after controlling for ¯xed e®ects and
age components, the marginal return to each single labor type has gone up, from 10% in the
HS drop-outs case case to 30% for college graduates. Moreover, we can now rationalize the
1980s plunge observed in the raw earnings and wages series as a time e®ect: this roughly
corresponds to the time in which the e®ects of the baby boom generation came to their full
fruition.
4.3 Education Speci¯c Labor Inputs
Consider the problem of studying the production function
Yt = F (H1t;H2t;H3t;Kt)
From national accounts data (NIPA) we can obtain long time series of aggregate output.
We also have observations on aggregate physical capital, Kt, and on the wage bills that are
paid in each year to di®erent education groups (denoted as WBe
t)51.
In order to retrieve technology parameters it is necessary to identify and estimate HC
aggregates, Het
52, which are de¯ned as an e±ciency-weighted sum of individual labor sup-
plies. The crucial question is whether we can recover (H1;H2;H3) for a reasonably long
number of periods.
Our approach is to identify (H1;H2;H3) by combining information on observable wage




t = wetHet (15)
We can identify HC aggregates by using the estimated time series of skill prices c wet obtained
from the wage equations.
The main problem with this identi¯cation procedure is a data measurement problem:
in the US fringe bene¯ts and other employer's contributions are often not recorded as
straightforward earnings53 and can account for a sizeable proportion of yearly earnings.
50An arbitrary normalization has been made to set the scale of the various wage components. Details available from the
authors.
51The (yearly) wage bill for a given education group is the total labor payments received by people within that education
group in a given year.
52The subscripts e and t stand for human capital type (as implied by the educational level) and date of observation.
53An example, pointed out by Ken Judd, is that of employer's pension contributions which can account for over 10% of
yearly earnings.
18Furthermore, they are likely to represent di®erent proportions of total earnings in di®erent
education groups, and tend to be higher for college graduates. This might lead to and
underestimate of the aggregate human capital for the higher education groups.
4.4 Combining CPS data and PSID estimates
The wage bills should reliably represent the distribution of US working population over
education groups in each year. For this reason we use CPS data: the Current Population
Survey (CPS) is a monthly survey of about 50,000 households conducted by the Bureau
of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statistics.54 This monthly survey of households is
conducted for BLS by the Bureau of the Census through a scienti¯cally selected sample
designed to represent the civilian noninstitutional population. Respondents are interviewed
to obtain information about the employment status of each member of the household 15
years of age and older. Each month about 50,000 occupied units are eligible for interview.
Some 3,200 of these households are contacted but interviews are not obtained because the
occupants are not at home after repeated calls or are unavailable for other reasons. This
represents a non-interview rate for the survey that ranges between 6 and 7 percent. In
addition to the 50,000 occupied units, there are 9,000 sample units in an average month
which are visited but found to be vacant or otherwise not eligible for enumeration. Part
of the sample is changed each month. The rotation plan, as explained later, provides for
three-fourths of the sample to be common from one month to the next, and one-half to be
common with the same month a year earlier. The CPS has been used to collect annual
income data since 1948, when only two supplementary questions were asked in April: "How
much did ... earn in wages and salaries in 1947 ..." and "how much income from all sources
did ... receive in 1947". Over the years, the number of income questions has expanded,
questions on work experience and other characteristics have been added, and the month
of interview relating to previous year income and earnings has moved to March. This
yearly survey goes under the name of March CPS Supplement.55 Age classi¯cation is based
on the age of the person at his/her last birthday. The adult universe (i.e., population of
marriageable age) is comprised of persons 15 years old and over for March supplement data
54The survey has been conducted for more than 50 years. Statistics on the employment status of the population and related
data are compiled by the Bureau Labor Statistics (BLS) using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS).
55Today, information is gathered on more than 50 di®erent sources of income, including noncash income sources such as
food stamps, school lunch program, employer-provided pension plan and personal health insurance. Comprehensive work
experience information is given on the employment status, occupation, and industry of persons 15 years old and over.
19and for CPS labor force data. Each household and person has a weight that should be
used in producing population-level statistics. The weight re°ects the probability sampling
process and estimation procedures designed to account for nonresponse and undercoverage.
Unweighted counts can be very misleading and should not be used in demographic or labor
force analysis.
We use the CPI for all urban consumer (with base year 1992) to de°ate the CPS earning
data and drop all observations that have missing or zero earnings. Since the earning data
are top-coded for con¯dentiality issues, we have extrapolated the average of the top-coded
values by using a tail approximations based on a Pareto distribution.56
Figure (5) reports the number of people working in each year by education group, as
reported by the CPS. Employed workers are a rough measure of employed human capital.
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Figure 5: Employed workers in millions, by education and year
It is clear that some strong and persistent trends towards higher levels of education have
characterized the sample period. This might seem all the more surprising since the return
to higher education have increased substantially over the sample period.
Figure (6) plots both the average earnings by year and total wage bills in billions of
dollars. Since CPS earning data until 1996 are top coded we report both the censored mean
and a mean adjusted by using a method suggested by the BLS (West (1985) which is based
on the original Hill's estimator to approximate exponential tails. The di®erence between
56This procedure is based on a general approach to inference about the tail of a distribution originally developed by Hill
(1975). This approach has been proposed as an e®ective way to approximate the mean of top-coded CPS earning data by
West (1985); Polivka (2000) provides evidence that this method closely approximates the average of the top-coded tails by
validating the ¯tted data through undisclosed and con¯dential non top-coded data available only at the BLS.
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Figure 6: Total and average earned labor income, by education and year. Total in billions of 1992 dollars,
average in units of 1992 dollars.
the two averages is larger for the most educated people who tend to be more a®ected by
top-coding. We include also self-employed people in the computation of these aggregates;
however, their exclusion has almost no e®ect on the value of the wage bills and human
capital aggregate, as they never represent more than 5% of the working population in a
given education group (and most of the times much less than that).
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Figure 7: Value of e±ciency weighted labor supply (HC) in billions of 1992 dollars, by education and year
Finally, dividing the wage bills by the exponentiated value of the time e®ects estimated
through the wage equations using PSID data we ¯nally obtain point estimates of the value
21of e±ciency weighted total labor supply (human capital aggregates) by education and year.
These are plotted in ¯gure (7).
Notice that the evolution of human capital over time is non-monotonic, unlike the wage
bills for the two highest education groups. This is due to the large increase in the level
of estimated marginal product of these two factors in the early 1990s, which has grown
proportionally more than the total remuneration of these factors. We take this as an
indication of substantial changes in underlying technology parameters over that period.
4.5 Permanent characteristics and their distribution
We `residually' identify permanent characteristics (¯xed e®ects) µi, whose estimate is de-
noted as b µi, from the sequence of agent-speci¯c residuals associated to the wage equation









t=1 lnwit ¡ d lnwt ¡ \ g (ageit)
T (i)
where T (i) is the total number of observation available on agent i. If we assume that the
unconditional distribution of ability has not changed over the time period covered by our
sample, we can use the estimated ¯xed-e®ects as an estimate of the fµig distribution over
the working population.
Under this speci¯cation the individual ¯xed e®ects µi capture omitted sources of per-
manent heterogeneity which have some e®ect on individual earnings: they range from ob-
servable characteristics such as gender and race to non-observable characteristics such as
cognitive ability and family background. In this sense, the resulting distribution of es-
timated ¯xed e®ects can be thought of as a single-index summary of multi-dimensional
heterogeneity.
These forms of heterogeneity constitute an essential part of the individual ability to earn
that is not due to age or price e®ects. We include idiosyncratic permanent characteristics
in the numerical simulations using a discretized distribution based on the shape of the
estimated empirical density.58
57The so-called incidental parameters problem a®ects the FE estimates: limited panel lenght is responsible for FE estimation
bias. The fact that our estimates rely on people who are observed at least for 8 years partially reduces the bias.
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Figure 8: Estimated density of log ¯xed e®ects for small (67-93) and large (67-00) samples
In ¯gure (8) we report the empirical frequencies of b µ obtained by aggregating both cross-
sectionally and longitudinally. Changing the lenght of the sample and using weights does
not introduce any substantial variation on the shape of the density. Therefore, we don't
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Figure 9: Density of IQ measurement from 1972 PSID wave, for the whole sample and a comparable
sub-sample
Since the 1972 wave of the PSID contains a one-o® IQ test for people who took part, we
also report the normalized empirical density of the test scores for the whole 1972 sample
and for a subsample selected by using our sampling criteria. This o®ers a relatively easy
way to compare our inferred approximation to ¯xed e®ects with an actual measurement
based on IQ. Figure (9) reports the measured IQ densities for the whole 1972 sample and
the selected sub-sample. It seems that both the IQ density and the estimated ¯xed e®ect
density exhibit a long left tail, indicating a larger downward dispersion. They are both
strikingly non-normal.
distribution of the ability to earn, but cannot be used to infer information about the conditional distributions of ability in
each education group because the longitudinal PSID sample that we select fails to represent the marginal densities of the US
population over age and education. This problem becomes more severe the further away we go from the original sampling
date. We have estimated this distribution using both the large sample covering the period between 1967 and 2000 and a
smaller sample for covering the period 1968-1993. Furthermore, we have checked whether weighting the estimated b µ using
PSID longitudinal weights would change the estimated empirical frequencies of ability.
234.6 Analysis of labor e±ciency shocks
The wage equation residual, rescaled by removing the permanent characteristics, varies by
construction around zero along time and across individuals and is de¯ned as
^ ueit = lnweit ¡ ^ g (agenit) ¡ ln ^ wet ¡ ^ µi
We assume that the error term ^ ueit can be decomposed into two components
^ ueit = zeit + meit
where zeit is an autocorrelated error process and meit is classical measurement error iid(0;¾2
em).
If we assume that fzeigt is a autocorrelated process59
zeit = ½ezeit¡1 + "eit
with "eit~iid(0;¾2
"), we can achieve identi¯cation of the autoregressive parameters in one of
several ways. A ¯rst possibility is to use the following second moments
V AR(^ ueit) = V AR(zeit) + V AR(meit)

















COV (^ ueit; ^ ueit¡1)
V AR(^ ueit) ¡ V AR(mit)
(16)
Of course an external estimate of V AR(meit) is necessary in this case.
59We could assume either a unique autoregressive coe±cient ½ for all education groups and a set of group speci¯c ½e. We
choose the second option, which can provide a measure of insurability of shocks by education group.
60In fact if the above speci¯cation is correct then we have that













24An alternative way to identify the autoregressive coe±cient without resorting to an
external estimate of V AR(mit) is also available, given classical measurement error.




Furthermore, we can compute
e ueit ¡ ^ ½e eueit¡1 = ^ "eit = (zeit ¡ ^ ½ezeit¡1) + (mit ¡ ^ ½emit¡1) = "eit + (mit ¡ ^ ½emit¡1) (17)
The moments of the constructed residual ^ "eit are
















COVj (^ "eit) = 0 j ¸ 2
and can be used to test the goodness of the speci¯cation we assume for the z process.
4.7 Estimation and Testing of Labor Shock Processes
We present estimates of the autoregressive coe±cients obtained using external estimates of
measurement error by French (2000), who provides a lower and a upper bound estimate for
measurement error (respectively 0:0172 and 0:0323). Our results are based on an average
of the two. The (bootstrapped) standard errors are in parenthesis. Higher persistence is
associated with higher values of ^ ½e: higher persistence implies as a less insurable kind of
shock and corresponds to a more volatile lifecycle pattern for earnings.
Table 2: Estimates of the autoregressive coe±cient ^ ½ , by education group and pooled. Bootstrapped S.E.
in parenthesis
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Pooled
0.651 0.557 0.608 0.584
(0:130) (0:042) (0:058) (0:034)
The estimated values for ^ ½e seem indicate that group 2 (High school graduates) expe-
rience the lowest earnings' risk.62 These ¯ndings are apparently in contrast with some of
61Estimates are based on non weighted residuals, as weighting would not add any information, since heterogeneity is factored
out of the errors by construction.
62The point estimates of ¾2
" for the pooled case is 0:01156, whereas for the LTHS, HSG and CG cases is, respectively,
0:01040, 0:01250 and 0:0098. We also perform tests based on the autocovariance structure of the AR(1) residuals, in order to
check for the goodness of the speci¯cation. They validate the speci¯cation choice and are available from the authors.
25the recent literature, among others Storesletten, Telmer, and Yaron (2002) and Meghir and
Pistaferri (2004). However, using the upper estimate of measurement error we get parame-
ters very close to one. Moreover, alternative speci¯cations of measurement error (such as
non-classical autocorrelated noise) can push up these values. in the numerical simulations
we experiment with various levels of persistence.
4.8 Aggregate Technology parameters
As we mentioned before, the estimation of an aggregate production function can only rely
on constructed data for the aggregate labor inputs Het.
In identifying and estimating technology parameters, we start from the relatively easier
case of Cobb-Douglas technology













Using NIPA data we ¯nd the share of capital ® to be between 0:3 and 0:35, depending
on whether we correct for housing stocks. The share parameters A and B can be easily
expressed as a function of the aggregate wage bills. Moreover, we can apply the delta
method to approximate the standard errors of such functions. If we apply this procedure
separately for each year we can pinpoint the evolution of these functions over the sample
period.
Figure 10: Labor shares in human capital input of technology, computed using Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation
(with bounds equal to +/- 2 standard errors). Period: 1968-2000. Larger bounds after 1996 are due to
changes in top-coding of income in the CPS.
26Figure (10) reports the value of the share parameters (with bounds equal to 2 standard
errors) for the shares associated to each human capital variety. In ¯gure (10) the line
that is increasing over the sample periods represents A, whereas the downward sloping one
represents (1 ¡ A)(1 ¡ B). The almost °at line on top is (1 ¡ A)B.
The time average of such shares is A = 0:33, (1 ¡ A)B = 0:54 and (1 ¡ A)(1 ¡ B) =
0:14. The evolution of the college graduates labor share over time more than doubles (from
0.2 to 0.4) whereas the share of less-than-high-school labor falls dramatically from over 0.30
to roughly 0.06. These ¯ndings con¯rms what we found in terms of marginal products of
labor using PSID data: major shifts in technology have taken place between the late 1960s
and the end of the century.
We follow up our initial ¯ndings by performin some additional inference on the technology
parameters. in order to do this we ¯rst approximate the total human capital factor H =
F fH1;H2;H3g by combining NIPA and CPS data on wage bills and physical capital63 and
then use a 2-step GMM method which controls for endogeneity and serial correlation of TFP
to estimate the parameters. In what follows we present some results obtained by applying
the above method to the log-linearized version of the production function in which we set
the elasticity parameters of a general CES speci¯cation to zero.
In fact, we ¯nd that a 2-step GMM procedure applied to the unrestricted CES speci-
¯cation provides scarcely robust and highly insigni¯cant estimates for all technology pa-









expf can be easily log-linearized as
lnF (Ht) = AlnH3t + (1 ¡ A)[B lnH2t + (1 ¡ B)lnH3t] + ft
and given the small sample dimension (30 observations) this linearization makes the GMM
procedure more robust and reliable. Moreover, in a C-D speci¯cation it does not matter
whether H2 is nested with H1or H3. Such distinction would matter only in a more general
CES speci¯cation.64.
The results of the GMM estimation of our favourite speci¯cation for the log-linearized
C-D technology are reported in the following tables (standard errors in parenthesis) for two
63Deatails of the model can be provided by the authors.
64We also run further check with a standard Powell-Newton algorithm using calculus conditions to identify a minimum.
To minimize the objective function we use a simplex method algorithm ¯rst proposed by Nelder and Meade (1965). This
method has the advantage to check whether a candidate set of estimates is a real minimizing set by using a quadratic expansion
in the neighborhood of such set and verifying that the minimum of such quadratic form corresponds to the minimum found
by the Simplex.
27alternative moment weighting matrix choices (the identity matrix and the optimal matrix
Table 3: Point estimates of (long-term, 1967-1997) labor shares in technology (S.E. in parenthesis)





We also ¯nd that the linear trend included to control for TFP deterministic variation is
estimated to be 0.035 and strongly signi¯cant. Given the log speci¯cation, this is equivalent
to say that we ¯nd an average yearly TFP growth rate of roughly 3.5% between 1967 and
1997.
The point estimates for A and B give labor shares very similar to the long-term averages
we estimate using the initial Cobb-Douglas computation. Also the standard errors are
very close to the ones we have obtained by using the delta method. Remarkably, the labor
shares roughly sum up to one, even though we don't impose this restriction in the estimation
procedure.
5 Simulations
The parameter estimates from the previous sections are used to set model parameters (tech-
nology, labor shocks, permanent characteristics, age-earnings pro¯les) for our equilibrium
analysis. In the simulations each time unit represents a year and the parameters are based
on yearly estimates.
5.1 Preferences parameters
We use utility CRRA preferences
















The parameters º and ¸ of the period utility jointly pin down the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution of consumption, that is 1
1¡º(1¡¸). With º = 0:33 and ¸ = 2:00 we have that
such elasticity is roughly 0:75.
285.2 Demographic and cost parameters
Individuals are assumed to be born at the real age of 16, and they can live a maximum of
j = 50 years, after which, at the real age of 65, death is certain (retirement is not modelled,
so that agents die at the end of their working life). The sequence of conditional survival
probabilities fsg
50
j=1 is based on mortality tables for the US.
The direct cost of education De is set to be equal to 0.3 times the average earnings in
the economy, which corresponds to an estimate of average (in-state) tuition costs for public
and private colleges in the US.65
Tuition subsidies (Te) as a share of average earnings have changed over the last 30 years.
A long term average stands at roughly 1=2 of the tuition costs. We run several experiments
based alternative levels of tuition subsidization.
5.3 Some simple tuition experiments
The numerical experiments we report in the rest of this section are compared to a simple
benchmark economy in which the discount factor ¯ is set to match a physical capital over
output ratio of 3:0. The resulting discount factor is very close to one, with the ¯rst 3
decimals all being equal to 9.
The tax rates (on capital income and labor earnings) are both set to 15%. The deprecia-
tion rate is set to 0:07, which we compute from NIPA data. No assets borrowing is allowed
in the benchmark economy.
Notice that we report experiments in which the deterministic leisure function fe (µ) is set
to match enrolment rates: this presents however a problem, because there are potentially
many functons which can satisfy this condition for the \marginal student". We ignore this
problem in the following simulations, although we are currently working on two alternatives
to circumvent it. These experiments should therefore be considered as preliminary evidence
only.
The initial wealth distribution is endogenously determined in this simulations: the ac-
cidental bequests are distributed to the new borns following the asset density of those
individuals who have died. Nobody is born with negative assets by assumption, but some
people are born with zero assets and others with di®erent, positive amounts. In the simula-
65Source: Education digest, NCES, National Center for Education Statistics.
29Table 4: Tuition experiments both for ¯xed prices (P.E.) and market clearing prices (G.E.) - Comparison
to Benchmark with no subsidy.
Tuit. Subs. % workers Month. Salary 0 assets r
$92 $92 by edu $92, pretax % of pop. %
LTHS HS C LTHS HS C
Benchmark 5826 0 25.2 58.5 16.3 1111 2023 2899 12.2 3.92
50% subs. (PE) 4831 2415 5.3 16.2 78.5 921 1677 2403 5.7 3.92
50% subs. (GE) 5821 2910 25.2 58.4 16.4 1110 2021 2890 12.1 3.90
150% subs. (PE) 4868 7302 5.3 16.4 78.2 928 1690 2422 6.0 3.92
150% subs. (GE) 5840 8761 25.1 58.3 16.5 1121 2027 2889 11.9 3.87
tions we are not correlating initial assets and permanent characteristics, although we plan
to do it in the future.
The most obvious tuition subsidy experiment is implemented by giving people, ceteris
paribus, a transfer (same for all) equal to a percentage of the direct cost of schooling.
The following table reports results for such experiments. No additional taxes are levied on
people in order to ¯nance the additional subsidy costs: resources are obtained from existing
tax revenues. This simplifying assumption is admittedly more realistic for the P.E. case
than for the G.E. case.
Results are reported in table 5:3 .The tuition cost in dollars changes in the experiments
because tuition costs are computed as a ¯xed percentage of average earnings, which change
in di®erent experiments. This allows however to maintain consistency in relative prices.
We report the percentage of workers in the di®erent education groups, the pre-tax monthly
salary by education group, the proportion of people in the economy with zero assets and
the pre-tax interest rate.
It is immediately evident that big di®erences exist between the ¯xed price P.E. case
and the G.E. case: in P.E. tuition subsidies seem to have big e®ects on overall output and
earnings inequality (which go down), on college enrolment which jumps up by three times
and on the proportion of people with zero assets, which also goes down.
All these e®ects are cancelled in G.E., when prices are let free to adapt the the new
supply of labor skills. In this case we ¯nd almost no change with respect to the benchmark
30Table 5: Tax experiments both for ¯xed prices (P.E.) and market clearing prices (G.E.) - Comparison to
Benchmark with no subsidy.
Tuit. Subs. % workers Month. Salary 0 assets r
$92 $92 by edu $92, pretax % of pop. %
LTHS HS C LTHS HS C
Benchmark 5826 0 25.2 58.5 16.3 1111 2023 2899 12.2 3.92
cut K tax 2/3 (PE) 10411 0 36.8 29.9 33.2 1985 3615 5180 0.08 3.92
cut K tax 2/3 (GE) 5334 0 25.7 54.0 18.6 1015 1852 3079 15.9 4.14
economy.
If we think of P.E. as a policy intervention targeting a small part of the population, it
is evident that micro-interventions yield massive e®ect, which dissipate as the scale of the
intervention increases.
In this economy there is no asset brrowing, so that poor
5.4 Some tax experiments
We also run some simple tax experiments, which again we compare to the benchmark
economy. In this case we cut the tax rates on capital income by 2=3.
Cutting the physical capital tax gives an insight on the e®ects of changes in taxation of
interest income on education decisions. Heckman (1976) argues that increased taxation of
interest income encourages investment in human capital because of a simple substitution of
a cheaper method of transferring consumption across periods.
Results for the tax experiments are reported in table 5:4.
The result of the capital tax experiment seems to indicate that in P.E. there is less
HC accumulation when we reduce capital income tax, as we might expect from the simple
substitution argument described above. However, there seems to be a positive e®ect on the
type of HC accumulated, with relatively higher levels of college graduates which is quite
interesting. The incentives are profoundly changed by this kind of policy. In GE we have
relatively small changes with respect to the benchmark, but the switch from HS to College
persists and is signi¯cantly larger than any tuition policy intervention in G.E..
316 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the relationship between individual education decisions and
life cycle earnings, considering the case of alternative policy interventions changing the
parameters of the model.
We use the model to impose structure on U.S. data and directly estimate some relevant
parameters of the economy we want to model. This framework allows us to numerical
simulate the model economy in order to answer assess the e®ects of policy interventions
under both partial and general equilibrium assumptions.
We ¯nd that the general equilibrium implications of interventions almost completely
cancel out the e®ects that are visible under partial equilibrium assumptions. This is in line
with results proposed by Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998a). The inclusion of risky
returns on labor earnings and the fact that labor supply is endogenous lend additional
credibility to the result. The distributional changes in this economy under di®erent inter-
ventions will be the focus of additional analysis. Moreover, future work includes assessing
the relevance of liquidity constraints in the model economy and the equilibrium e®ects of
arti¯cially removing (insuring against) some of the risk components. The importance of
risk in the partial equilibrium individual decision about schooling will also be the object of
future extensions.
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35A PSID Data
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics provides information on a variety of dimensions.
Since the beginning it was decided that those eligible for the 1969 and following waves
of interviewing would include only persons present in the prior year, including those who
moved out of the original family and set up their own households66. Until recently, there
used to be two di®erent releases of PSID data, Release I (also known as Early Release) and
Release II (also known as Final Release). Early release data were available for all years; ¯nal
release data are available (at time of writing) only between 1968 and 1993. The variables
needed for our study are available in both releases. The di®erence is that Release II data
tend to be more polished and contain additional constructed variables. We use Release II
data for the period 1968-1993 and Release I data for the period 1994-200167.
Because of successive improvements in Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI)
software, the quality of the Public Release I ¯les improved dramatically in recent waves,
allowing the use of these data with con¯dence. The di®erentiation between Public Release
I and Public Release II has recently been dropped altogether.
A.1 Sample selection
Unequal probabilities of selection were introduced at the beginning of the PSID (1968)
when the original O±ce of Economic Opportunity (OEO) sample of poor families was
combined with a new equal probability national sample of households selected from the
Survey Research Center 1960 National Sample. Compensatory weights were developed in
1968 to account for the di®erent sampling rates used to select the OEO and SRC components
of the PSID.
The probability sample of individuals de¯ned by the original 1968 sample of PSID fam-
ilies was then followed in subsequent years. A distinction between original sample indi-
viduals, including their o®spring if born into a responding panel family during the course
of the study (i.e., both those born to or adopted by a sample individual), and nonsample
individuals was also made. Only original sample persons and their o®spring have been
66A distinction between original sample individuals, including their o®spring if born into a responding panel family during
the course of the study (i.e., both those born to or adopted by a sample individual), and nonsample individuals must be
made. Details about the observations on non-sample persons and their associated weights and relevance are included in the
appendix.
67We also have results obtained from a reduced sample using only Release I data for 1968-1993: estimates of the parameters
of interest don't substantially di®er from the full sample estimates.
36followed. These individuals are referred to as sample persons and assigned person num-
bers in a unique range. If other individuals resided with the sample individuals, either
in original family units or in newly created family units, data were collected about them
as heads, spouses/long term cohabitors or other family unit members, in order to obtain a
complete picture of the economic unit represented by the family. However, these nonsample
individuals were not followed if they left a PSID family.
Sample persons who are living members of a 1968 PSID family have a sample selection
factor equal to the reciprocal of the selection probability for their 1968 PSID family unit.
The computation of the sample selection weight factor for sample persons who are \born
into" a PSID family after 1968 uses a formula that is conditional on the \sample status"
of their parents. However, data for nonsample persons present a problem for longitudinal
analysis since the time series for these individuals is left censored at the date at which they
entered the PSID family. Furthermore, it is not likely that this left censoring is random
with respect to the types of variables that might be considered in longitudinal analysis.
Because of the left censoring of their data series, nonsample persons in PSID families have
historically been assigned a zero value selection weight factor and a zero-value for the PSID
longitudinal analysis weight68. This is of course a problem when using the core SRC: non
sample people can be tracked through their Person 1968 number (that assumes values
between 170 and 228) and whenever we use individual weights we control for the presence
of non-sample individuals.
An additional dimension that is included in the core longitudinal weights are adjustments
for panel attrition due to nonresponse and mortality. Attrition adjustments were performed
in 1969 and every ¯ve years thereafter.
In general individual longitudinal weight values for PSID core sample persons are the
product of three distinct sets of factors, that can be summarized as follows:
1. a single factor that represents the reciprocal of the probability by which the sample
person was \selected" to the PSID panel;
2. a compound product of attrition adjustment factors developed in 1969 and every 5
years thereafter,
68Beginning with the 1993 wave, PSID is providing users with a ¯le that includes special weights that will enable analysts
to include all 1993 sample and nonsample person respondents in cross sectional analysis of the 1993 PSID data set. These
weights are called cross-sectional weights (as opposed to the standard longitudinal weights that have been produced from 1969
onwards).
373. mortality adjustment factors also developed and applied in 1969 and every 5 years
thereafter.
A general formula that re°ects the composite nature of the individual weights is:







where: Wi;sel is the selection weight factor { the reciprocal of probability that individual i
is selected to the PSID panel by membership in a 1968 PSID sample family or by birth to a
PSID sample parent; Wi;NR(j) is the attrition adjustment factor applied to the ith individual
weight at time period j; Wi;M(j) is the age, sex and race-speci¯c mortality adjustment
applied to the ith individual weight at time period j69.
The 1967-1992 Final Release Sample. The 1968-1993 PSID individual ¯le contains
records on 53,013 individuals (that is, all who were ever present in the sample at least on one
year) We drop members from the Latino sample added in 1990 (10,022 individuals) and keep
a sample of 42,991 individuals. We then drop those who are never heads of their household
and we are left with a sample of 16,028 individuals. We then drop all individuals who are
younger than 25 and older than 60, which leaves us with a sample of 13,399 individuals.
Dropping observations for self-employed people reduces the sample to 11,574 individuals.
We keep in our sample only people with at least 8 (possibly non continuous) observations,
which leaves us with 4,529 individuals. Dropping individuals with missing, zero or top-coded
earnings reduces the sample to 4,300 individuals, and dropping individuals with total hours
of work that are missing, zero or larger than 5840 further reduces our sample to 4,295
individuals. We eliminate individuals with outlying earning records, de¯ned as changes in
log-earnings larger than 4 or less than -2, which leaves 4,211 individuals in the sample.
Finally, dropping people who are connected with the original SEO low-income sample
leaves us with a sample of 2,371 individuals.
The composition of the sample by year and by education group is reported in the fol-
lowing tables.
The 1967-2000 Mixed (Final and Early Release) Sample. After dropping 10,607
individuals belonging to the Latino sample and 2263 individuals belonging to the new
immigrant families added in 1997 and 1999, the joint 1967-2001 sample contains 50,625
69Of course, non sample people have a zero weight because Wi;sel = 0 for them.
38Table 6: Distribution of observations for the 1967-1992 sample, by year
year Number of Observations year Number of Observations
1967 783 1980 1575
1968 853 1981 1551
1969 906 1982 1551
1970 965 1983 1586
1971 1090 1984 1636
1972 1192 1985 1656
1973 1280 1986 1610
1974 1328 1987 1535
1975 1382 1988 1484
1976 1428 1989 1415
1977 1489 1990 1349
1978 1513 1991 1285
1979 1550 1992 1201
Table 7: Distribution of observations for the 1967-1992 sample, by education group
years of education Number of Individuals Number of Observations
less than 12 330 4,804
12 to 15 1,354 19,902
16 or more 687 10,487
individuals. After selecting only the observations on household heads we are left with
19,583 individuals.Dropping people younger than 25 or older than 60 leaves us with 16,733
people. Dropping the self employment observations leaves 13,740 persons in the sample.
We then select only the individuals with at least 8 (possibly non continuous) observations,
which further reduces the people in the sample to 5559. Dropping individuals with unclear
education records leaves 5,544 people in sample. Disposing of individuals with missing,
top-coded or zero earnings reduces the sample to 5,112 individuals and dropping those
with zero, missing or more than 5840 annual work hours brings the sample size to 5,102
individuals. We eliminate individuals with outlying earning records, de¯ned as changes in
log-earnings larger than 4 or less than -2, which leaves 4,891 individuals in the sample.
Finally, dropping people connected with the SEO sample reduces the number of individuals
to 2,791.
The composition of the sample by year and by education group is reported in the fol-
lowing tables.
39Table 8: Distribution of observations for the 1967-2000 sample, by year
year Number of Observations year Number of Observations
1967 776 1983 1546
1968 842 1984 1582
1969 891 1985 1609
1970 952 1986 1632
1971 1069 1987 1624
1972 1168 1988 1631
1973 1250 1989 1639
1974 1290 1990 1600
1975 1342 1991 1628
1976 1385 1992 1564
1977 1442 1993 1551
1978 1466 1994 1486
1979 1502 1995 1437
1980 1535 1996 1363
1981 1512 1998 1293
1982 1505 2000 1191
Table 9: Distribution of observations for the 1967-2000 sample, by education group
years of education Number of Individuals Number of Observations
less than 12 364 5,358
12 to 15 1,621 25,358
16 or more 806 13,587
40